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2.  International production networks and trade
liberalization:  A literature review
Dionisius A. Narjoko
2.1. Introduction
This chapter reviews the relevant literature in order to provide an analytical
framework for the analyses in the subsequent chapters.  It covers some sub-topics related
to the theme of this study, in particular, the theoretical approach to international production
networks, key findings from empirical studies on the subject, and the role of trade policy
(often understood as trade liberalization) in creating or sustaining an IPN.
Section 2.2 explains the concept, theoretical approaches and other topics related to
IPNs, such as the relationship between an IPN and agglomeration.  Section 2.3 reviews the
empirical literature on IPNs, while Section 2.4 discusses factors that contribute to the
creation of IPNs in the Asian region, i.e., the role of MNCs and trade liberalization policies.
2.2. Explaining IPNs
2.2.1. The idea of the value chain
Porter (1985) briefly defined the value-chain concept as a chain of related and
dependent (business) activities needed to produce a product or service, starting from
conception, through different phases of production, delivery to final consumers and
after-sales services, to disposal or recycling.  It underlines the notion of sequential and
interconnected structure of economic activities, with each element or link in a value chain
and adding value in the process (Henderson and others, 2002).
More specifically, Porter divided all of the activities in a value chain into two big
groups:  primary and support.  Primary activities include research and development,
manufacturing, marketing, and logistics services; while support activities include finance,
human resources management, and technology development and procurement.  Figure 2.1
describes the categorization of these activities.
Moreover, two characteristics reflect the complexity of a value chain, as noted in
UNIDO (2004).  First, a value chain may include a wide range of related and dependent
activities within each link of the chain or between different chains.  It is common for
a producer of an intermediary input to be involved in several value chains.  Second,
activities of a value chain can span within and across geographic boundaries, either at the
country level or the regional level.  This implies that the activities are not only carried out
within the boundary of a single firm – as in the traditional Porter value-chain concept – but
also by more than one firm located in more than one country or region.6
2.2.1.1. Global value chains
These characteristics have become more noticeable with the evolution of the
value-chain concept.  Value-chain activities are now often observed to make up a large
interconnected value-chain system that has become known as a global value chain (GVC)
(Kuroiwa and Toh, 2008).
In parallel with GVC, the concept of global or international production networks
(IPNs) emerged.  In contrast to the concept of GVC, which focuses on the activities in value
chains, IPNs focus on the (complex) interrelationships among firms operating along the
value chains in a systematic nature.  To put it simply, an IPN focuses on the interaction
between firms that are involved in two or more value chains, thereby implying network
linkage of value chains in which two or more value chains share the same firm (Sturgeon,
2000).  As in the GVC concept, the notion of “international/global” in IPN indicates the global
nature of the relationships (i.e., across country borders).
IPNs are viewed as complementing GVC (UNIDO, 2004; Kuroiwa and Toh, 2008).
They reflect the accelerated fragmentation of knowledge-intensive activities of some value
chains, which is possible because these activities have become increasingly modularised
(UNIDO, 2004).  The modularization allows the activities to be separated from the value
chains and performed at different locations (Ernst and Luthje, 2003).
2.2.2. Defining IPN
There is no unique definition of an IPN.  According to Henderson and others (2002),
an IPN is defined as the nexus of interconnected functions and operations through which
goods and services are produced, distributed and consumed.  Production networks not only
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Source: Porter, 1985.7
integrate firms as well as parts of firms into structures that blur the traditional organizational
boundaries, but also integrate national economies.  Henderson and others also postulated
that the nature and articulation of the network were influenced by the social and political
context within which it is embedded.  Ernst and Kim (2002) described an IPN as a major
innovation in the organization of international business, where it combined concentrated
dispersion of a value chain across countries with a parallel process of integrating
hierarchical layers of network participants.  Kimura and Ando (2005b) defined an IPN as
comprising vertical production chains that are extended across countries within a region as
well as distribution network across the world.  Kimura and Ando (2005b) identified the major
player in the network as corporate firms belonging to the machinery industry, including
general machinery, electrical machinery, transport equipment and precision machinery.
2.2.3. Analytical framework for explaining IPN
It is important to understand the mechanics of the network and to derive the
determining factors of IPNs.  There are two approaches that the literature records so far on
the explanation of an IPN.  These are discussed below.
2.2.3.1. Industrial organization approach (‘flagship’ model)
The first analytical approach views IPNs from the perspective of industrial/business
organization, particularly concerning international business.  This approach was put forward
by Ernst and Kim (2002), who said that the emergence of IPNs had been the result of fiercer
competition in international markets.  This is a natural consequence of two processes that
happen at the same time, i.e., rapid trade and investment reforms that had occurred in many
countries, and the rapid development and diffusion of information and communications
technology (ICT).  The processes lead to a dramatic change in the idea of how
multinationals operate.  They should no longer operate with their focus on a stand-alone
overseas direct investment, but should move towards a new model of business operation.
The new model was named by Ernst and Kim as the “global network flagship”, and
they postulated three driving forces behind the transformation from the traditional
multinational-corporation model to the flagship model (Ernst and Kim, 2002).  The first
driving force was liberalization.  This includes trade liberalization, capital-flow liberalization,
more liberal policies governing foreign direct investment (FDI), and privatization.  Their main
argument was that the global corporations of the flagship model benefited from liberalization
and also provided the corporations with opportunities in the form of a substantial reduction
in costs and risks for conducting international transactions, and an increase in the liquidity of
capital, globally.
The following are the benefits and opportunities provided by liberalization:
(a) Locational specialization, which would translate into a wider range of choices
of firm entry (e.g., licensing, subcontracting, franchising etc.);
(b) Outsourcing, which provides a flagship company with external resources and
capabilities that it needs to complement its core competencies;8
(c) Spatial mobility, which means a reduction in the cost of spreading the value
chain to other locations.
The second driving force is the growing complexity of the dynamics of competition.
The major issue here is a dual challenge in which, on the one hand, companies need to
serve all major markets if they want to perform internationally, since globalization tends to
make the borders of countries or regions irrelevant.  On the other hand, companies must
also integrate their global-scale of activities, in order to exploit and coordinate linkages
across different locations.  The growing complexity changes the determinants of firm
organization, growth and location.  One example is the hard disk drive-producing MNCs’
decision to establish a production base in South-East Asia to increase efficiency by
transferring labour-intensive activities, such as assembling, to several countries in the
region.  More specifically, it becomes substantially more difficult for firms to generate all the
capabilities they need internally to cope with the complex and fierce competition.  Therefore,
the appropriate approach appears to be to selectively source-specialized capabilities from
outside the firms.  Thus, it needs a shift from the individual style of company organization to
a more collective style of company organization.
The third force is the rapid development and diffusion of ICT.  Essentially, it allows
for the development of a leaner and more agile production system that is able to cut through
country borders.  It plays a role as a “flexible infrastructure” that can link and coordinate
economic activities at distanced locations (Antonelli, 1992; and Hagstrom, 2000).  The idea
of a production network that needs to be able to quickly adapt to the fast changing global
circumstances is thus perfectly moderated by the rapid development and diffusion of ICT.
All these have formed one of the major impacts of technology that is able – at the same time
– to increase the mobility, or dispersion, of firm-specific resources and capabilities across
regions as well as create greater scope for cross-border linkages (i.e., the integration of
some dispersed specialized clusters).
1
The industrial organization approach views an IPN as a network that covers
intra- and inter-firm transactions and forms of coordination; it consists of various hierarchical
layers that range from a flagship company down to many, usually smaller, locally specialized
suppliers (Ernst and Kim, 2002).
Here, the flagship company dominates the network and is the heart of it.  It provides
strategic and organizational leadership beyond resources that lie directly under the
management control (Rugman, 1997).  The strategy of a flagship company thus becomes
the strategy that governs the position and role of the other participating firms in the
network.
2 In most cases, the flagship retains in-house many of the activities in which the
company has some comparative advantage, and outsources the rest.
1 Ernst and Kim (2002) argued that the other impact of ICT was the fact that the cost and risk of
developing ICT had, in fact, been a main factor for market globalization/integration. This is because,
naturally, the huge expenses associated with R&D for developing the technology need to (somehow) be
amortized; this is allowed, in one way, by increasing sales – i.e., if the companies conducting R&D want
to keep the constant level of their profitability, given the enormous R&D costs.
2 The participating firms include all subcontractors, suppliers, service provider and strategic partners.9
As noted, the flagship company dominates a production network.  The power for
controlling the network comes as a result of the control of the company over its critical
resources as well as from its sufficient capacity to coordinate transaction and knowledge
exchange with the other nodes of networks.  Because of this characteristic, the other – and
smaller – participating firms therefore do not have the same reciprocal control over either
the flagship or strategy of the flagship company.
There are two types of (international) flagship companies, i.e., “brand leaders” and
“contract manufacturers”.  An example of a brand leader is Cisco (Ernst and Kim, 2002),
where the flagship is connected to 32 manufacturing plants globally.
3  These plants were
formerly independent, but they became interrelated once they all supplied Cisco.  The
suppliers had to go through a lengthy process of certification to ensure that they met Cisco’s
requirements.  Unlike brand leaders, contract manufacturers, such as Solectron or
Flextronics, establish their own (international) production networks that serve the global
brand leaders.  The contract manufacturer type rapidly gained in importance in the 1990s
together with the phenomenon of divestment of many overseas facilities by brand leaders
(Ernst and Kim, 2002).  The contract manufacturer type was thus seen as the “panacea” of
the 1990s (Lakenan, Boyd and Frey, 2001), although it occurred, at least initially, mostly in
the electronics sector.  As noted in Ernst (2002), the increase in the importance of the
contract manufacturer type reflects a growing importance of vertical specialization that is
particularly pronounced in the electronics industry.
According to the flagship model, there are two tiers of local firms that supply the
flagship company, i.e., higher- and lower-tier suppliers (Ernst and Kim, 2002),
4 with
higher-tier suppliers playing an intermediary role between the global flagship and lower-tier
local suppliers.  The higher-tier suppliers deal directly with the flagship, possess valuable
proprietary assets and have even developed their own mini-production networks.  The
suppliers in this tier should be able to support all steps in value chain, and even undertake
some coordination functions that are necessary for the global supply-chain management.
An example of higher-tier suppliers can be found in Taiwan Province of China’s Acer group
(Ernst, 2000).  Meanwhile, lower-tier suppliers are in a more precarious position.  As Ernst
and Kim explained, the lower-tier suppliers normally lack proprietary assets, have a weak
financial situation and are highly vulnerable to external shocks (e.g., market conditions, and
technology and financial crises).  The lower-tier suppliers’ main competitive advantages
are low-cost production with speedy and flexible delivery.  These suppliers rarely deal with
the flagship company and mostly work with the higher-tier suppliers, and are typically used
as “price breakers” and “capacity buffers” that can be dropped (from the production
networks) at very short notice.
It is worth mentioning two key points related to small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), within the idea of the flagship model.  First, SMEs are usually among the lower-tier
firms.  The major competitiveness value of firms in the lower tier is their very low cost
3 Other examples of brand leaders include General Electric, IBM, Compaq and Dell.
4 Ernst (2004) argued that the division of the suppliers tier was specific to suppliers in the Asian
region.10
structure and high degree of flexibility, which are the main characteristics of SMEs in
general.  Second, the fact that SMEs are located in the lower-tier of IPNs naturally creates
a threat to their survival.  This is simply because, as price breakers and capacity buffers,
they can be dropped at short notice, thus making them the weakest link in a production
network (Ernst, 2004).  Sturgeon and Lester (2004) gave as an example the adoption by
Compaq of a new strategy to produce and sell personal computers for less than $1,000,
which resulted in many small companies that manufactured personal computers in Taiwan
Province of China being forced to shut down their operations.
2.2.3.2. Production process approach – “two-dimensional fragmentation”
Another approach views IPNs in terms of the nature of the production process, often
known as the fragmentation theory.  Production of a final product usually consists of many
production processes that are vertically integrated; here, the fragmentation theory
postulates that such vertically integrated production processes can be divided into
separable production blocks that can be operated in locations that are most suitable for the
activities of each block (Kuroiwa and Toh, 2008).
The fragmentation theory approach is, in principle, a newly developed strand of
research in international trade theory.  Sanyal and Jones (1982), and Jones and
Kierzkowski (1990) developed an early theoretical model that established the concept of
fragmentation.  Other studies along this line include those by Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001),
Cheng and Kierzkowski (2001), and Deardorff (2001), who further enhanced the capability
of the fragmentation concept in both theoretical and empirical analysis.  The Kimura and
Ando (2005a) study is among the most recent in developing the analytical framework within
the fragmentation approach.
The idea of fragmentation can be understood from Deardorff (2001), who defined
fragmentation as “the splitting of a product process into two or more steps that can be
undertaken in different locations but [which] lead to the same final product”.  Suppose that
there is initially a large factory taking care of all the production activities from upstream to
downstream.  If a careful look is taken at the individual production blocks, however, it can be
seen that some require close attention by technicians, while other production blocks are
labour-intensive.  Therefore, if the firm can separate the production processes and locate
them in appropriate places, total production cost can be reduced.  The relocation of the
production blocks can occur across national borders, which is commonly observed in IPNs.
Fragmentation becomes economical when the so-called cost of service links
connecting production blocks is low enough.  Service links costs include transport,
telecommunications as well as various coordination costs between the production blocks.
Service links also depend on the nature of technology.  Here, globalization is seen as a way
to reduce service links costs and enable firms to “fragment” their production blocks in an
attempt to further reduce overall production costs.11
Kimura (2008) suggested that two key elements were needed for the existence of
fragmentation – first, there must be some cost-saving in the production blocks; second, the
cost of service links must not be too high.
As noted above, Kimura and Ando (2005a) presented the most recent analytical
framework for explaining IPNs.
5  That framework lends itself to explaining the mechanics of
IPNs in East Asia and it was therefore of particular importance for this study.  As noted
in many other studies, including Kimura (2008), IPNs established in East Asia were
perhaps more complex and sophisticated than suggested in the traditional description of
fragmentation as in, for example, Deardorff’s (2001) framework.
Kimura and Ando (2005a) categorized various types of fragmentation activities into
two groups in a two-dimensional space (figure 2.2).  The first dimension is the “distance”,
which captures the physical distance between the original position and the new location of
the fragmented production blocks.  This dimension is represented by the horizontal axis in
5 The presentation here is borrowed mainly from Kimura and Ando, 2005a, and Kimura, 2008.
Figure 2.2. Two-dimensional fragmentation


















figure 2.2, with the origin being the “original position”.  Thus, when the distance is short, or
not far from the original position, the fragmentation tends to occur within a country’s borders;
however, when the distance is rather far from the original position, the fragmentation most
likely occurs beyond a country’s border (i.e., cross-border fragmentation).
The other dimension is “uncontrollability”, which captures the extent of managerial
controllability over the fragmented production blocks.  The dimension is represented by the
vertical axis of figure 2.2.  Managerial controllability over production blocks reduces as
a point moves further from the original position.  Given that ownership should be the
important factor linking controllability, it is thus presumed that the ownership of the parent
(or perhaps the flagship) company is smaller when a point moves away from the original
position, even though the relationship between control and ownership might not be linear.  A
point near to the original position represents intra-firm fragmentation, while a point that is
quite far from the original position represents inter-firm, or arm-length, fragmentation.
The fragmentation along the vertical axis, in short, represents fragmentation in the
form of outsourcing to (possibly) unrelated firms.  Various forms of outsourcing are
observed, such as original equipment manufacturing (OEM), original design manufacturing
(ODM) and electronics manufacturing services (EMS).  These forms are observed
particularly in East Asian fragmentation.  In this form, fragmentation is the element that adds
to the traditional conception of fragmentation that is considered to be specific to the
fragmentation model of East Asia.
The main idea behind fragmentation is separating production blocks with some
potential cost-saving benefits.  Table 2.1 summarizes this for the two-dimensional
fragmentation model, together with the (service-link) costs arising from conducting the
fragmentation.  The “distance” fragmentation faces service links costs that arise from the
geographical distance to production blocks (e.g., transportation, communications and
intra-firm coordination costs).  The cost-saving benefits, therefore, need to be drawn from
location-specific advantages.  These include not only the traditional economic factors, such
as wage levels and resource availability, but also the existence and quality of infrastructure
and its services, and the policies of the host country’s government (e.g., a favourable
investment climate, liberal trade policy and flexible labour policy).
Meanwhile, as for “uncontrollability” fragmentation, the cost-saving in principle
should come from advantages of “de-internalization” and, therefore, from the counterpart’s
competitive advantages.  Cost-saving is feasible when counterparts have better technology
and managerial capability, allowing some production cost savings when the production
processes are conducted by the counterparts rather than by the parent, or flagship, firm.
However, some service link costs still exist in the “uncontrollability” fragmentation, i.e.,
everything that occurs due to the loss of managerial control over the production blocks.
2.2.4. IPN and agglomeration
Observation of IPNs, particularly those in East Asia, suggests that the mechanics of
production networking is not as simple as described by the analytical frameworks above.
Some researchers (e.g., Kimura and Ando, 2005a; and Yeung, 2008) argued that there was13
a close relationship between IPNs and agglomeration, and that in fact the two worked
hand-in-hand.  Kimura and Ando (2005a) argued that fragmentation and agglomeration
were important when the relationship among firms was issue, and that this was particularly
true when intra-firm location decisions were considered – although theoretically it appears
implausible due to the opposite nature of the two (i.e., fragmentation implies “separation”
while agglomeration implies “collection”).  Yeung (2008), meanwhile, argued that IPNs must
take place in industrial clusters.
Before moving on in this discussion, it is important to review the idea of
agglomeration.  As mentioned by Yeung (2008), there are three major types of industrial
clusters in which the agglomeration process take place, according to the following divisions
given by Gordon and McCann (2000):
(a) Type 1 – the classic model of pure agglomeration;
(b) Type 2 – the industrial-complex model;
(c) Type 3 – the social-network model.
These models are summarized in table 2.2.  The type 1 model postulates that
industrial clusters are developed through natural agglomeration economic activities and
firms in the clusters therefore, enjoy positive externalities from their location.  These firms,
however, do not necessarily have interdependency among them.
The agglomeration that underlies the type 1 model originates from the availability of
some specific input that can be used by all firms in the clusters, such as specialized labour.
The type 2 model agglomeration comes from the deliberate construction of industrial
complexes that have the objective of minimizing transaction costs for inter-firm trade
through spatial concentration and proximity.  Firms coming within this model enjoy low
transportation and logistics costs as well as low uncertainties through mutual interactions
that are facilitated by physical proximity.  Unlike type 1 model firms, type 2 model firms
assume some interdependencies among them.  Finally, the type 3 model refers to the
importance of local networks of interpersonal relationships, trust and institutionalized
practices.
Table 2.1. Service link costs and cost-saving elements of the two-dimensional
fragmentation model
Service link cost Production cost
Fragmentation (distance) Cost due to geographical Location advantages
distance
Fragmentation Cost due to weaker control “De-internalization”
(uncontrollability) advantages (counterpart’s
ownership advantages)14
According to this model, strong social and institutionalized networks should assist in
some specific knowledge being developed in the clusters, which, in turn, should contribute
to technological innovation and knowledge development.  Type 3 model firms are often
recognized for their highly-localized innovation and production activities.






 accruing to firms in
sources
clusters
Pure agglomeration Neo-classical 1. A local pool of specialized Within clusters
economies model economics after labour (lower search costs)
Alfred Marshall 2. Local provision of non-traded
inputs (economies of scale)
3. Maximum flow of information
and ideas (product and
market knowledge)
Industrial complex Location theory 1. Lower transport and logistics Within clusters
model after Alfred costs
Weber 2. Greater certainty in
transactions
Social network Embedded in 1. Localized trust and Within clusters
model new economic inter-personal relationship
sociology (relational assets)
2. Institutionalized practices,
e.g., conventions and norms
(institutional thickness)
Source: Adapted from Gordon and McCann, 2000.
Kimura and Ando (2005a) further argued that there were two channels by which
agglomeration connected with fragmentation.  First, the connection comes as the result of
the increasing returns nature of service link costs.  Typically, service link costs, either in
terms of “distance” or “uncontrollability”, characteristically have strong economies of scale.
Therefore, it is natural to postulate that there should be some locations that are specifically
built to provide low service link costs – utilizing the scale economy nature of the costs.  In
what follows, it is also natural to predict the tendency for many production blocks to be
located in these locations, often observed in practice as industrial clusters.
Looking at the typology of industrial clusters (table 2.2), low service link costs are
present in all three types of clusters.  In the type 2 model, for example, the low service link
costs are to be found in terms of transport and logistics costs, which fits in with the idea of
fragmentation along the “distance” dimension.
The other channel is to provide support for arms-length fragmentation inside
agglomeration.  This is a situation where some critical transactions involving inputs for the15
arms-length production block, such as exact delivery timing, are needed.  In this situation,
upstream and downstream firms need to be located near each other.
The key point for the relationship between fragmentation and agglomeration is that it
gives an element of locational advantages along the “distance” dimension – through the
existence of low distance-related service link costs (e.g., transportation and logistics).  At
the same time, agglomeration moderates fragmentation along the “uncontrollability”
dimension through the opportunities for control separation that stem from the existence of
numerous potential business partners growing in industrial clusters.
In his study of activities of some industrial clusters in South-East Asia, Yeung (2008)
found evidence that fragmentation and agglomeration worked hand-in-hand in forming
cross-border production networks.  He found that the classical pure agglomeration
arguments that underlay all models of industrial clusters (table 2.2) were not sufficient to
explain the growth and development of some industrial clusters in the region.  This is
observed in the industrial clusters that produce HDDs, in which Yeung (2008) found no
resemblance in the characteristics of these clusters those of the model in table 2.2,
particularly the type 2 industrial complex model.  Yeung found that these clusters were
formed and developed with the strong presence and contributions of lead firms and their
strategic partners in international production networks.  Industrial clusters for the HDD
industry in Penang, Bangkok and Singapore collectively formed a tight regional production
network led by lead firms such as Seagate and Western Digital.  Firms in these clusters
enjoy the benefit of network economies through their participation in the HDD industry value
chain.
2.3. Review of empirical studies on IPNs
The subject of IPNs is a growing research topic, but the body of empirical literature
on this subject is still rather sparse.  To some extent, this can be explained by the fact that
the topic itself is being continuously expanded.  However, this lack of empirical studies is
also linked to the availability of data and proper methods of analysis.  Nonetheless, some
empirical studies are available in the literature, and this section reviews selected ones.  To
organize the review, this section is divided into three sub-sections based on the major
issues to be examined.  It is worth noting that almost all of the empirical studies reviewed
here concern IPNs in the Asian region.  This is because IPNs grow more rapidly in this
region, compared with those in Europe or North America.
2.3.1. Evidence of IPNs in East Asia
Empirical studies on the existence and development of IPNs dominate the body of
the empirical literature including, for example, Ng and Yeats (2003), Kimura and Ando
(2005a and 2005b), Ando (2006), and Athukorala and Yamashita (2006).  All these studies
employed international trade data or firm-level data in reporting on the occurrence and
development of IPNs.
A rapid increase in the importance of trade in those industries in Asia that are
intensive in human capital, technology and capital – such as machinery, electronics,16
telecommunications, and parts and components – arguably provides the first and clearest
evidence for the occurrence of IPNs in the region.
Ng and Yeats (2003), in their comprehensive examination of international trade data
for countries in East Asia, outlined two basic facts.  First, by detailing the product
composition of country exports during 1985-2001, they found that the export share of
machinery and transportation goods increased by about 27 percentage points in that period.
A large increase in the share was observed for many countries in the region, except for
Brunei Darussalam, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia.  In fact, China,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand recorded very large increases of more than
30 percentage points.  Second, Ng and Yeats (2003) found that high technology and skilled
labour-intensive products dominated the list of the fastest-growing export products in the
region at the four-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) level during the
same period.  They found that electrical machinery (defined using Rev. 2 of SITC 77)
exports accounted for about 20 per cent of the total export value of the fastest-growing
products.
Kimura and Ando (2005a), as well as Athukorala and Yamashita (2006),
re-emphasised the observation by Ng and Yeats (2003).  Using the Harmonized System
(HS) of data classification for international trade, and focusing only on machinery and
machinery parts and components during the 1990s’ decade for some countries around the
world, Kimura and Ando (2005a) found that the export share of those products in many East
Asian countries had reached more than 40 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively, by the
end of the decade.
Another important insight was provided by Kimura and Ando (2005a), in addition to
the increased importance of the machinery trade, was that a clear change had occurred in
the pattern of trade between developed and developing countries.  At the beginning of the
1990s, trade in machinery products was dominated by countries such as Germany, Japan,
the United Kingdom and the United States.  In 2000, however, this had changed, with many
developing East Asian countries becoming top world traders of such products.
The second form of evidence for the existence of IPNs is an indication of the
growing importance of vertical intra-industry trade.  Ando (2006) attempted to distinguish
types of trade by countries in the East Asian region during the 1990s by using data from
three sample years, 1990, 1996 and 2006.  Using the six-digit level of HS trade data and an
appropriate methodology (i.e., the “decomposition threshold approach”), Ando decomposed
each country trade into two groups – one-way trade and intra-industry trade (IIT) – and
further decomposed IIT into horizontal and vertical IIT.  For each country, a certain range of
overlapping values of exports and imports is defined as IIT and the rest as one-way trade.
Meanwhile, within IIT and still for each country, the intra-industry trade of products with
a small unit price differential between exports and imports is considered as horizontal IIT,
and the rest (i.e., reflecting high/large unit price differential) as vertical IIT.
The vertical IIT reflects the existence of product fragmentation, according to the
analytical framework adopted by Ando (2006) from, for example, Falvey and Kierzkowski,
1987, and Flam and Helpman, 1987.  This framework is based on the argument that two17
countries with different income distribution have different factor endowments or different
technologies.  This, by standard comparative-advantage arguments, results in countries with
high technology and income levels exporting high-quality products, while countries with low
technology and income levels export low-quality products.  Therefore, the large difference in
the export prices, which reflect the quality of products, implies vertical IIT, which is often
regarded as the “quality ladder” phenomenon.
Conducting an empirical exercise, Ando (2006) found some interesting evidence that
suggested the incidence of product fragmentation in East Asia.  Her findings can be
summarized as follows.  First, for the overall trade in machinery products by the countries
under consideration, the importance of vertical IIT increased sharply while the importance of
one-way trade declined substantially.  In particular, the share of one-way trade in most of the
countries was about 40-50 per cent in the early 1990s, but that share declined to about
half of it in the early 2000s.  All countries except the Republic of Korea and Singapore
experienced rapid growth in vertical IIT.
Second, the importance of vertical IIT is clearly apparent in machinery parts and
components, indicated by the much higher increase in vertical IIT for machinery parts and
components rather than for machinery as a whole.
The third, and perhaps the most important finding regarding product fragmentation,
is the indication of the rapid expansion of “back-and-forth” transactions.  Specifically, Ando
(2006) found no evidence that vertical IIT in low-income countries was systematically in the
form of commodities with export prices lower than import prices.  In other words, there is no
evidence of the “quality ladder” hypothesis.  This is because quite a large extent of vertical
IIT is the export price, which is higher than the import price.  Ando translated the statistics
into a situation whereby countries import (expensive) capital-intensive intermediate inputs,
use these inputs in local production, and then export the produced goods as either final or
other intermediate inputs  that have higher value-added.
Some other evidence for the existence of IPNs in East Asia was derived from the
examination of firm-level data, such as that conducted by Kimura and Ando (2005a and
2005b), for example.  Kimura and Ando (2005a) conducted some descriptive and
econometric analyses using two rich datasets of Japanese multinationals operating around
the world.  The datasets enabled them to gauge the characteristics of Japanese MNCs as
well as their (foreign) affiliates across countries as well as some changes in the mechanism
of production relationship between the (Japanese) parent companies and their (foreign)
affiliates.
Regarding characteristics, the findings by Kimura and Ando (2005a and 2005b) can
be summarized as follows.  First, a large portion of Japanese firms that have invested
abroad (i.e., about 80 per cent of all Japanese MNCs) have at least one affiliate in the East
Asian region; however, overall, more than half of all the MNC affiliates are located in this
region.
Second, most of the Japanese MNCs and their affiliates operate in the
manufacturing sector, and about half of them operate in the machinery sector.  Moreover,18
the extent of this concentration on manufacturing operations has tended to increase over
time, as indicated by about a 10 per cent increase in the number of the affiliates operating in
the sector.
Third, based on the list of activities implemented both by the parent companies and
by the affiliates, together with the fact that most of the affiliates are SMEs, Kimura and Ando
(2005a) inferred that parent companies established their foreign affiliates with the objective
of conducting a subset of activities that originally were (supposedly) to be conducted by the
parent companies.  Kimura and Ando (2005a) argued that this – together with the previous
characteristics – was a typical strategy of firms involved in manufacturing operations, which
essentially reflects the existence of product fragmentation.
The fourth characteristic, which provides stronger evidence of the existence of IPNs
in East Asia, is a suggestion that the extent and incidence of outsourcing activities is very
large for the Japanese firms’ operations in East Asia.  This comes as a result of a logit
regression analysis for the operation of the parent firms that includes, among other factors,
an outsourcing dummy variable.  A positive coefficient of the outsourcing dummy variable
would support the conclusion that outsourcing is very important for the product
fragmentation process.  As table 2.4 shows, the estimated coefficient for the dummy
variable was indeed positive for the regression of the firms investing in East Asia.  Together
with the estimated coefficients of the other variables, Kimura and Ando (2005a) further
inferred that Japanese firms operating in East Asia tended to (a) have large employment
levels at home, (b) use superior technology, (c) enjoy extensive foreign sales, (d) conduct
in-house R&D activities and, most importantly, (e) be highly flexible in de-internalizing their
production process by fragmenting their production blocks among other companies (i.e., the
affiliates).
Another important finding was that the extent of flexibility, and hence presumably
capacity, for de-internalizing – and hence conducting outsourcing – appeared to be
significantly larger for the Japanese MNCs investing in East Asia, compared with those
investing in the United States and in European countries.  The coefficients of the
outsourcing dummy variables were either no longer significant or showed negative signs
(although often insignificant) for the regressions of firms investing in the North American and
European regions in more recent years, i.e., a comparison of the regression results of 2000
with those of 1995 (table 2.3).
The other set of important findings by Kimura and Ando (2005a), who observed
changes in the mechanism of the production relationship between the parent companies
and their affiliates, showed that more than 90 per cent of sales, or purchases, of the
affiliates in East Asian countries went to, or came from, countries in the region.  A more
important finding was the indication that much of those transactions originated not only from
Japan to local economies or:  from local economies to Japan, but also expanded to other
countries within the region.  The figures are:  for sales by affiliates in 1998, 49 per cent went
to the domestic market, 25 per cent to Japan and 17 per cent to other countries within East
Asia, except Japan.  For purchases in the same year, 43 per cent of the purchases came
from the local economy, 35 per cent from Japan and 19 per cent from the other East Asian
countries, except Japan.19
T
able 2.3. Logit-regression result for the characteristics of Japanese MNCs investing in other countries
(i) Dependent variable:  1995
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Adapted from Kimura and 
Ando, 2005a, and authors’
 calculations based on METI database.
Notes:
Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics.
Results are statistically significant at 
a 
1 per cent level,
 b 
5 per cent level and 
c
 10 per cent level.  
The data for the outsourcing dummy for 1995 and 2000
are not exactly the same due to changes in the questionnaires.  In the case of 1995, the questionnaire was strictly limited to 
the production commission
in the production of manufacturing goods.  On the other hand, the 2000 questionnaire requested that the outsourcing expenditure
 be embodied in
production costs, sales costs etc.
* Indicates similar regression model, but done on larger firms.22
There is also evidence that the Japanese firms’ affiliates in East Asia have tended to
gradually substitute their intra-firm transactions with other firms, i.e., the arm-length firms.
Kimura and Ando (2005a) found that the affiliates’ share of either intra-firm sales or
purchases declined quite substantially in a very short period (1995-1998), with a matching
increase in the share of arm-length transactions.  As for the statistics, during the same
period the share of the affiliates’ intra-firm transactions declined from 31 per cent to 30 per
cent, and from 43 per cent to 33 per cent for sales and purchases, while the share of the
affiliates’ arm-length transactions increased from 59 per cent to 61 per cent for sales and
from 52 per cent to 65 per cent for purchases.
It is worth mentioning that the increased importance of the arm-length transactions
indicates the existence of “back-and-forth” transactions, a fact that is also consistent with
the major findings by Ando (2006).
Kimura and Ando (2005a) further noted that the extent of the increased amount of
“back-and-forth” transactions, however, varied substantially across the two importance
subsectors within the general machinery sector.  Specifically, the data indicated that the
extent of the “back-and-forth” transactions by the affiliates was greater in the electronics
sector, compared with the transactions in the telecommunications sector.
2.3.2. Mapping existing production networks
IPNs comprise vertical production chains that extend across the countries in the
region as well as distribution networks throughout the world.  In the past decade, the East
Asian economies added “the formation of international production/distribution networks” to
their major characteristics, with MNCs as the major players in the machinery, textiles and
garment industries.
Ando and Kimura (2003) found that although similar networks existed in other parts
of the world (e.g., the United States-Mexico, and Germany-Hungary/Czech Republic).  The
networks in East Asia are distinctive and have the following characteristics:  (a) they have
become a substantial part of each country’s economy in the region; (b) they involve a large
number of countries at different income levels; and (c) they include both intra-firm and
arm’s-length relationships.  Ando and Kimura calculated customs duty import ratios (ratio of
total customs duty revenue of a country to the c.i.f.-based import value) and found that the
ratios were much smaller than the average tariff figures.  Another insight was that the ratios
presented a clearly decreasing trend over time.  These phenomena were partly due to
unilateral tariff reductions for IT-related products in the 1990s and to the effective usage of
the duty drawback system.
Ando and Kimura (2003) concluded that the most important change in the trade
pattern of the region was the explosive increase in the trading of machinery parts and
components, including general machinery, electrical machinery, transport equipment and
precision machinery.
A study by Lall, Albaladejo and Zhang (2004) provided a more detailed look at the
mapping of production networks in East Asia.  They compared the development of23
production networks in East Asia with Latin America and the Caribbean, with the focus on
the electronics and automotive industries.  The study revealed that the electronics industry
was fragmenting faster than the automotive industry, mainly for the technical reasons of high
value-to-weight ratios and lower capability needs for the “fragmented” process.  Export
growth in electronic products was also due to faster innovation and demand growth, with
fragmentation having been a major force.  East Asia did much better in developing
production networks in the electronics industry than did Latin America and the Caribbean,
owing to: (a) the strategies used to build up local capabilities; (b) targeted FDI strategies;
and (c) countries in the region offering efficient export-processing sites when production
networks started.
The intensity of fragmentation differs by industry, depending on four factors:
(a) technical divisibility of production processes; (b) factor intensity of the process (labour-
intensive vs. less labour-intensive); (c) the technological complexity of each process
(simpler processes are usually relocated); and (d) the value-to-weight ratio of the product
i.e., light, high-value products can be shipped long distances, in order  to exploit differences
in cost, while heavy, lower-value products can only be shipped to proximate areas or remain
in the parent country.
As for electronics, the intra-East Asia trade in this industry as a whole grew much
faster than the exports to the rest of the world – here, economies defined as East Asia
include:  China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the Philippines;
Singapore; Taiwan Province of China; and Thailand.  By 2000, the region’s trade was valued
at about 38 per cent of total electronics exports (50 per cent including Japan).  Intraregional
imports grew even faster and outpaced imports from the rest of the world, with the East
Asian countries contributing 50 per cent and Japan contributed the another 20 per cent.
Consequently, the regional trade balance became negative over time, with the deficit of
these nine East Asian economies growing faster than with Japan; however, the trade
balance with the rest of the world became increasingly positive, especially with the United
States.  This significant increase in intraregional trade had a large “fragmented” component,
which means that the region was becoming knitted into a tight production network, not only
to meet increasingly regional needs, but also to serve the rest of the world.
China, meanwhile, evolved differently from the other economies.  In 2000, the
regional share of Chinese exports fell by 39 points while its share of imports rose by
76 points.  During the same period, the rest of the world was the destination for 51 per cent
of its exports while accounting for only 8 per cent of China’s imports, indicating that China
was acting as a base for producers from neighbouring economies for processing and
exporting to other regions.  Singapore was more oriented to the other East Asian economies
and least of all to Japan, which is actually in line with Singapore’s emerging role as a
regional hub for MNC operations in East Asia.
Thus, a tight network is emerging within East Asia, with Japan playing an important
but not dominant role.  China’s entry is strengthening regional competitiveness.  MNCs are
fitting locations into complex specialization patterns that allow East Asia to retain facilities
and expand exports – although trade data cannot reveal how the pattern is changing.  There
is still competition for exports and high-value functions between the locations, but production24
networks have helped relatively high-wage countries such as Singapore to retain export
competitiveness.
With regard to the automotive sector in East Asia, Japan is the dominant player in
the production network.  However, the region has not formed a coherent network.  Auto
exports accounted for 2.8 per cent of total exports in East Asia in 1990 and 3.1 per cent in
2000.  Japanese MNCs use East Asia to assemble components for domestic markets and
for export to the rest of the world, as indicated by Japan’s low automotive imports and huge
exports.  The leading exporters from the Republic of Korea sell mainly to the rest of the
world, using significant imports from Japan.  Meanwhile, Thailand’s position, as the third
largest exporter, is similar to that of the Republic of Korea, although it is more dependent on
Japanese imports.  The Philippines is the only country that trades significantly within East
Asia, but it is a minor player in the electronics sector.
In East Asia, Japan has not built regional networks to serve its home market but
instead uses production bases to export to other destinations.  United States auto
companies have not invested in East Asia to serve their home market, unlike United States
electronics companies, since automotive products are too heavy.
Lall, Albaladejo and Zhang (2004) asserted that there was room for development
and expansion of the automotive production network in East Asia.  The Republic of Korea
became a significant auto exporter and invested in the region, but not for developing
integrated production systems.  Thailand is becoming a large production base for MNCs and
is currently the second-largest East Asian exporter.  Given the expansion of China’s auto
industry and the rapid growth in demand in the region, integrated production is likely to
increase, with the Republic of Korea, China, and Thailand as the hub of the future, but with
Japan still playing a major role and the other countries contributing as major suppliers of
complex components.
A study by Hiratsuka (2005) of production networks in hard-disk drive components
showed a clearer map of the extent of the East Asian networks.  In 1996, major IT-producing
nations met under WTO auspices and agreed to bind their MFN tariffs at zero for specific IT
goods, including computers, telecommunications, semiconductors, semiconductor
manufacturing equipment, software, instruments and apparatus.  The resulting Information
Technology Agreement (ITA) is a package deal in that no product-coverage exceptions are
allowed.  The ITA zero-tariff bindings are on a most-favoured nation (MFN) basis and thus
are available to exporters from any WTO member.
The ITA goal was to establish global free trade in the IT sector.  Initially, it was signed
by Japan, European Union member States and the United States.  However, it soon
produced a domino effect, as smaller countries signed up to the ITA as a way of attracting
foreign IT manufacturers.  Thus, ITA promoted production unbundling on a global scale
(figure 2.3).
Meanwhile, another study by Hiratsuka (2007) revealed more on global production
network, between East Asia, the European Union and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).  The study noted that one of the prominent features of the East Asian25
economy was the development of production fragmentation or networks characterized by
vertical specialization.  The trade pattern inside the enlarged East Asian region has
changed, from the traditional one in which final products were traded based on traditional
comparative advantage, to a pattern of trading massive amounts of parts and components.
Intermediate goods sourced from the same industrial activity have actively been traded
among the Asian economies, thus expanding intra-industry and intraregional trade.
Concerning intraregional trade of parts and components, three points need to be
addressed.  First, South-East and East Asia (particularly ASEAN and China) mutually trade
parts and components for manufacturing final products within the region.  Second, Japan
exports the bulk of its parts and components to ASEAN and China, and imports final goods
from them.  Finally, East Asia’s production networks have a close link with NAFTA and the
European Union, which export a large portion of their parts and components to ASEAN and
China.  Meanwhile, China and ASEAN export parts and components as well as consumer
goods to those advanced regions.
Figure 2.3. Global production network in IT-related goods
Source: Taken from Baldwin, 2007, which was adapted from Hiratsuka, 2005.
Note: This figure shows the nations where parts are sourced for hard-disk drives assembled in
Thailand; the hard-disk drives are then shipped to various markets for use in electronic
products.26
As agglomeration develops, materials and parts are gradually procured within
a country rather than from advanced countries.  In fact, Japanese affiliates operating
overseas tend to procure from Japan first and then gradually from other countries.  Logistics
service costs incurred in supporting these procurements are not small.  However,
transportation service costs in ASEAN and China are lower than those in advanced
countries.
2.3.3. Determinants of product fragmentation
Few studies that have attempted to gauge the determinants of production network
are available in the literature (e.g., Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006; and Kimura, Takahashi
and Hayakawa, 2007).  These studies adopted the general methodology of the gravity
model, which is quite popular as an empirical tool for examining bilateral trade between
countries.  The adoption of the gravity model usually follows the idea of expanding the
statistical equation of the determinants of bilateral trade between two countries by adding
some relevant variables derived from the analytical framework of product fragmentation.
Kimura, Takahashi and Hayakawa (2007) focused on finding evidence of some
reduction in the extent of service link costs in East Asia, relative to the situation in the North
American and European regions, and on testing the hypothesis of whether locational
advantage matters in product fragmentation.  They included geographical distance (DIS)
and the absolute value of the difference in GDP per capita (income gap) as the proxy for
service link costs and locational advantage, respectively, plus regional dummy variables to
facilitate the difference across regions (i.e., East Asia and Europe).  It is important to note
that what constitutes locational advantage includes, for example, the advantage regarding
factor-input prices (e.g., wages), good quality infrastructure and infrastructure services, and
a conducive policy environment.
After estimating the equations, Kimura, Takahashi and Hayakawa (2007) found
support for the hypothesis that locational advantage explains product fragmentation.  This
inference comes from the result that the coefficients of the income gap are positive across
the estimated equations, which implies that trading partners with wider differences in income
tend to trade more.  In addition, the inference is strengthened by the introduction of income
gap in equations that have regional dummy as one of its variable.  Introducing the income
gap evidently reduces the magnitude and importance of the regional dummy variable.  In
other words, much of the intraregional bilateral trade in East Asia can largely be explained
by income differences between trading partners; and because GDP per capita is a proxy for
wages and thus a proxy for locational advantage, Kimura, Takahashi and Hayakawa (2007)
concluded that locational advantage did matter in explaining bilateral trade in parts and
components, as noted above.
The result for the estimated coefficients of distance suggests that the extent of
service link costs in East Asia is substantially lower than in the European region.  In
particular, the estimated coefficients for distance are much smaller in East Asia than those in
the European region.  Thus, while service link costs in East Asia facilitate trade, the
coefficients suggest that the costs tend to penalise the performance of bilateral trade in
parts and components among countries in Europe.  The result for service link costs also27
suggests that East Asia provides a more favourable environment for production networking
than Europe does in terms of service links (Kimura, 2008).
The reduced service link costs suggested by the studies cited above also comes
from substantially lower transportation costs over time.  Hummels (1999) showed that the
average of the overall trade-weighted transportation costs had declined quite substantially in
the past 30 years.  This was due to technological advancement in the mode of transport,
such as using much bigger ships that could reduce the unit cost of the shipped goods, and
the expansion of air transport for delivering goods.  As reported by Hummels (2001), the use
of more advanced technology and systems in the transport sector enabled the cost of time
to be reduced from about 30 per cent to around 10 per cent.
6
Using the same framework and methodological approach, Ando and Kimura (2007)
added another important point regarding service link costs from the experience of East Asia.
That is, a high degree of transactions among production blocks requires more than just low
transportation costs; this is lower service link costs in terms of the production process.  Ando
and Kimura arrived at this inference based on the results showing that the estimated
absolute values of geographical distance coefficients were larger for the trade in parts and
components compared with those for trade in final machinery products and all other
merchandise.
Adding more insights into the determinants of product fragmentation, Athukorala and
Yamashita (2006) included intra- and extraregional dummy variables to capture the potential
effect, if any, from regional trade memberships (i.e., AFTA, the European Union, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, ANDEAN and ANZCERTA).  The results, however, were mixed.  Specifically,
the coefficients for the RTA dummies were only significant and positive – meaning promoting
trade in parts and components in the case of AFTA, while the coefficients representing the
other RTAs were either insignificant or showing an unexpected negative sign.  In summary,
Athukorala and Yamashita concluded that there was no evidence to support the hypothesis
that RTAs promoted (vertically) product fragmentation.  This is consistent with the fact that
much of the product fragmentation in the world has occurred mainly because of tariff
concessions.  The results from Athukorala and Yamashita’s research support the findings of
Egger and Egger (2005) who argued that the formation of an RTA would simply result in
substituting the current tariff concessions under export promotion schemes of developing
countries, rather than generating new incentives for promoting trade based on product
fragmentation.  In other words, in order to promote more trade based on product
fragmentation, an RTA must move beyond tariff concessions as a form of trade incentive.
Related to the role of regional or bilateral trade arrangements on IPNs it is worth
reporting the findings of Kumar (2007), who noted a potential positive impact of the RTA
concluded between India and the Republic of Korea on IPN.  Although India and the
Republic of Korea are already part of the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), the RTA
between the two countries has gone beyond tariff concessions of trade in the goods outlined
6 The same point on the declining shipping costs in the East Asian region was also presented in
a report by the Japan External Trade Organization (2002).28
in APTA.  Apart from tariff concessions, the RTA – known as the India-Korea Comprehensive
Economic Partnership Agreement (IKCEPA) – also includes trade in services, intellectual
property rights, measures of trade facilitation and investment liberalization.  Kumar (2007)
found that soon after the start of negotiations, Tata Motors of India acquired Daewoo Motors
of the Republic of Korea in 2005, and began a regional production networking strategy for
producing small and medium-sized cars.  This business strategy was implemented in order
to gain early advantage when the RTA entered into force on 1 January 2010.  In particular,
IKCEPA includes the promotion of cooperation, either through investment and/or tariff
reductions, in several sectors including the automotive sector.  In addition, some Republic of
Korea multinationals were also extending their regional production networks in India.
2.4. Trade liberalization and IPNs
The previous section shows that IPNs have been developed and established in the
East Asian region, and this is marked by the large extent of intraregional trade within the
region in the past two decades or so.  An important question here, together with the other
determinants of IPNs in the region, is whether or not the existence of the networks can be
explained by policy factors.  This section addresses this subject as well as a few other
issues related to the impact of many RTAs on IPNs.
2.4.1. Policy determinants of IPNs in East Asia
Adding a variable of policy changes can further explain the production networks in
the East Asian region.  The building blocks of production networks in East Asia stem from
two region-specific policy episodes or events.  One was the so-called “hollowing out” of the
Japanese economy in the 1980s, which triggered the relocation of Japanese firms to
neighbouring countries (Baldwin, 2007).
7  The hollowing out was motivated by the erosion of
competitiveness in the Japanese industries resulting from an increase in unit labour costs.
The rapid growth in wages and incomes in the Japanese economy during the 1980s and
1990s was not matched by increase in labour productivity.
Second, at the same time as the industry relocation process, East Asian countries
implemented the so-called “dual-track” strategic approach to industrialization (Kimura,
2006b).  The approach promoted the import-substitution and export-promotion
industrialization strategy.  In this approach, industries that commonly fall under the import-
substitution policy include the automotive, electrical appliances, basic metals and chemical
industries, while industries that have been part of the export promotion strategy are usually,
or mostly, either resource- or labour-intensive industries.  The export-promoting industries
are usually insulated from the rest of the domestic economy, which applies the import-
substitution approach, and are located in export processing zones.
7 The “hollowing out“ also occurred in several other more developed East Asian countries/areas at
that time, e.g., the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China in the 1990s.29
The hollowing out of the more developed East Asian economies, and Japan in
particular, nicely fitted into the “dual-track” strategy approach.  This triggered another round
of policy responses by the countries that had been the target of industrial relocation,
covering both investment and trade.
The investment policy response essentially comprised many policy packages with
the objective of attracting FDI.  It is worth mentioning that the “targeted” countries’ FDI
policies were very aggressive, reflecting the rather tight competition among them for the
alternative manufacturing sites of Japanese and other countries’ businesses.  Kimura
(2006b) noted that due to the fear of losing FDI to other countries, ASEAN countries even
took the radical approach of “accepting everybody” in their FDI policy approach.
As for trade policy, many Asian countries, and ASEAN countries in particular,
unilaterally cut their tariff rates, which is often viewed as a “race to the bottom” (Baldwin,
2006).
8  Moreover, according to Baldwin, some of those tariff cuts were in the form of
duty-drawback and duty-free treatment for establishments in export processing zones.  In
addition, over time, many countries realized the large benefit of lower trade costs by
switching from special treatments to lowering applied MFN tariff rates; as a result, many of
those countries have continued to cut their tariff rates unilaterally in the past two decades
(table 2.4).
Table 2.4. Unilateral tariff cuts in East Asia, 1991-2003
(Unit: Per cent, average applied tariff)
Country/area 1989 1992 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
India 59 34 31 28
Viet Nam 14 15 15 15 16
Thailand 40 40 20 16 15 14
China 42 35 16 16 15 11
Malaysia 14 14 9 9 9
Republic of Korea 14 11 8 8 8 8
Indonesia 23 16 11 9 7 7 7
Taiwan Province of China 10 6 6 6 6 6 5
Philippines 28 19 19 9 7 7 5 4
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0
Source: UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database.  Average applied
import tariff rates of non-agricultural and non-fuel products.
Note: Years are approximate since not all nations report data annually; however, tariffs change
slowly, so data for adjacent years have been substituted where needed.
8 Kuchiki (2005) mentioned some anecdotal evidence on the “race-to-the-bottom” unilateral tariff cuts.30
To summarize, the hollowing-out of Japanese businesses, changes in the
industrialization strategies of developing Asian countries, and their subsequent adoption of
deeper liberalization of FDI and trade policies have initiated and developed production
networks within the East Asian region.
The race-to-the-bottom in the unilateral tariff cuts and liberal FDI policy essentially
means a reduction in trade costs.  This aligns with some studies that have argued that the
reduction in cost for trade is what matters for the formation, and therefore the existence, of
IPNs.  Yi (2003), for example, showed theoretically the propagation effect of tariff reduction.
In particular, lower tariffs reduce the cost of producing vertically specialized goods by more
than that of regular goods; moreover, this propagation effect, according to Yi’s model,
increases as the number of production stages increases.  The model also indicates that tariff
reductions produce non-linear effects on the trading of vertically specialized goods.  This is
because the effect of the reductions in the second round (of further tariff reductions)
becomes much higher when the vertically and fragmented production mechanism is
established from the first round.
Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2003), in their study of the determinants of vertical
production networks involving United States multinational companies, provided some
support for the theoretical model devised by Yi.  In particular, they found that intermediate
inputs were negatively related to the cost of trade, and that the extent of the relationship
was very strong.  This therefore suggests that affiliates do respond to the change in the
price of intermediate imported inputs; in fact, the magnitude of the price change was found
to be rather large.  Working out from the estimated coefficient, Hanson, Mataloni and
Slaughter estimated that a 1 per cent reduction in prices – due to a reduction in trade costs
– led to a 3.3 per cent increase in the amount of intermediate input demanded by the United
States affiliates.
Nevertheless, the current literature does not provide sufficient evidence of the
linkages between existing RTAs and IPNs.  As noted in section 2.3.3, the gravity model
econometric exercise carried out by Athukorala and Yamashita (2006) revealed mixed
results for the RTA dummy variables; some coefficients were significant and positive, while
others were negative and even insignificant.  This mixed result showed that perhaps in
assessing the linkages between existing RTAs and IPNs, the gravity model may not be the
best fit.  RTAs are policies, and assessing policies in a gravity model setting may be
technically difficult.  Moreover, it is difficult to differentiate the effects of the
institutionalization of integration through RTAs and market-led integration in the gravity
model, which may explain the conflicting results of the model of the RTA dummy
coefficients.  Against this backdrop, there is a need for a more in-depth study of the linkages
between existing RTAs and IPNs.
2.4.2. RTAs and IPNs:  Other key points from the literature
The increased importance of IPNs and intraregional trade in East Asia imply a strong
incidence of regional integration.  However, this has occurred more because of market-led
integration, rather than integration that comes from formal trade agreements.  This is
because many of the (unilateral) tariff cuts that were made in the past two or three decades31
were motivated by the actions of private businesses; this is often called Asian-style
regionalism (Baldwin, 2007).  More recently, following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis,
countries in East Asia moved one step ahead with their regional integration agenda, in an
attempt to formalize the established market-led integration.  This was done by the
establishment of RTAs between countries within the region.  Policymakers in East Asia hold
the view that the formal arrangements can be regarded as part of the policy framework for
expanding production networks and supply chains formed by global MNCs and emerging
East Asian firms.
The key issue here is that – with the growing number of formal trade agreements –
how will the existing formal agreements influence IPNs, which have been working relatively
well in the region? Will they strengthen or weaken IPNs?
Before answering this question, it is important to first understand the current
situation regarding RTAs.  Without going into greater detail, a summary is needed of
a so-called “mess” resulting from the proliferation of many trade arrangements in the region
(Baldwin, 2007).
9  Many trade deals are currently being negotiated or discussed, but only
a few have actually been signed and implemented, creating the so-called “noodle bowl
syndrome”.  As described by Baldwin (2007) as well as Kawai and Wignaraja (2007), the
rapid growth in the number of agreements was, to a large extent, triggered by China’s
initiative to form FTAs with ASEAN (i.e., a domino effect resulted from the ASEAN-China
FTA).  Given the significant size of the Chinese economy, the domino effect reflects the
response of the other “big” countries in the region (i.e., Japan and the Republic of Korea) to
balance the potential regional power imbalance.
Some of the agreements in the region involve ASEAN countries as a single entity,
such as the ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan, and Republic of Korea-Japan RTAs.  In the case
of the RTAs with ASEAN in particular, the degree of complexity is even higher because such
RTAs entail bilateral agreements with each of the ASEAN countries.  Thus, for the ASEAN-
China RTA, for example, China and each ASEAN member choose their own sensitive list
and bilateral market access, depending on the list.  It is worth noting that this type of
arrangement is unique to the region.  Even greater complexity is added by the fact that
some ASEAN countries, such as Thailand and Singapore, are actively pursuing their own
bilateral agreements.  Yet, the noodle bowl does not seem to stop expanding, given the
rather ambitious agenda of ASEAN, which is actively pursuing RTAs with other countries,
such as India and Australia-New Zealand (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007).
Another key point is that, despite the increasing number of agreements, only a very
few have been implemented so far, such as the ASEAN FTA (i.e., AFTA).  Although AFTA is
perhaps the oldest, and hence the most well-established preferential trade agreement in
the region, it does not appear to have had a substantial impact on ASEAN intraregional
trade.  Part of the next section provides some explanation of why this happened; in short,
however, the rapid unilateral tariff cutting that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s (i.e., the
9 See, for example, Baldwin, 2007, and Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007 for a more detail description of
the “Asian noodle bowl syndrome”.32
“race-to-the-bottom” phenomenon explained above) appears to have undermined the
preferential advantages offered by the agreement.
2.4.2.1. How exactly do RTAs influence IPNs?
Theory suggests the impact of RTAs can go in one of two directions, either
strengthening or weakening the network.  The political economy framework of preferential
trade developed by Baldwin (2006) provides some idea of this theory.  Borrowing from
Baldwin (2006), figure 2.4 illustrates the equilibrium of a tariff setting in a country that
optimizes government choice, given the supply and demand of trade protection.
10
Figure 2.4 presents two curves, GFOC (unil) and FE, where the GFOC maps the politically
optimal tariff choice that a government can choose in unilateral setting, and the latter, FE,
maps the equilibrium number of firms in an import-competing sector.  The horizontal and
vertical axes represent the number of firms (n) and tariff rate (T), respectively.
10 See Baldwin, 2006, for a more detail explanation of the political economy approach of preferential
trade.
Figure 2.4. Impact of preferential trade agreements: Baldwin’s
political economy of tariff choices
Source: Reproduced from Baldwin, 2006.33
A country’s RTA with a trade partner shifts the FE schedule to the left (to FE’).  In this
scenario, RTA implies a tariff cut for the country’s importing sector (the movement from T
0 to
T’), and it has the effect of raising the amount of imported goods from the country’s RTA
partner due to the tariff reduction resulting from the RTA.  At the same time, however, the
increased amount of imported goods in turn forces domestic firms to exit the sector (the
reduction of n from n
0 to n’).  All these factors are reflected by the shift of E
0 to E’.  This
scenario leads to more trade between the two countries and hence, “trade blocs become
building blocks” (i.e., trade-creating).  The other scenario, of course, would be “trade blocs
are stumbling blocks” (i.e., trade-diverting).  This is illustrated by the right-shift of the FE
curve, moving the equilibrium point E
0 to E’’.  This scenario exists because, under Viner’s
ambiguity, the RTA may instead lower the amount of imports that correspond to a given level
of MFN  tariffs.  The import-competing sector now provides a smaller supply of goods, while
the expected profit of a firm increases; however, because higher tariffs give more protection,
only domestic firms respond to the increase (in expected profit), resulting in a higher number
of firms with E’ equilibrium.
The trade-creating effect is certainly the effect that policymakers are interested in,
even within the idea of how RTAs could strengthen IPNs.  Identifying practical policy
measures within this idea, however, is not easy, given the number of issues related to the
idea.  The rest of this section addresses this subject.
One important policy area is rules of origin (RoO), because they determine whether
products are eligible for preferential treatment under an RTA.  To facilitate the discussion, it
is useful to briefly mention the analytical framework and certain aspects of RoO, borrowing
from Krueger (1999), Krishna (2005), Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing (2007), Kawai and
Wignaraja (2007), and Baldwin (2007).
The proliferation of RTAs increases the attention given to RoO.  Krueger (1999)
found that RoO could cause controversy.  In particular, she explained that under the United
States-Canada RTA, a major dispute occurred between the two countries regarding RoO on
automobiles.  The Canadian assemblers had imported engines produced in the United
States and treated those engines as coming under the RTA.  The United States insisted that
a sizeable number of engine parts had been imported outside the RTA and that the vehicles
concerned were not eligible for RTA duty-free treatment.  This exemplifies the fact that the
enforcement and implementation of RoO also imposes costs, and can therefore be regarded
as a trade barrier.
Krueger (1999) asserted that RTA negotiations over RoO offered an opportunity for
producers to lobby for restrictive rules for goods of concern to them.  From a protectionist
viewpoint, RoO are an excellent instrument for two reasons.  First, they are not transparent;
it is impossible for the average person to know the cost of RoO.  Second, RoO provide
a good instrument for trade protection if such rules help the high-cost producers of
intermediate goods (e.g., auto parts) to gain access to the partner’s market in preference to
other lower cost sources outside the area of preferential trade arrangement.  The use of
higher cost parts from within a preferential trade arrangement means that the final products
are subject to zero tariffs when shipped within the arrangement.  This is in contrast to using
the lowest cost parts available from countries outside the RTA, which means that the final34
assembled product will not comply with the RoO and will face duties when shipped within
the area of the RTA.  Under this scenario, RoO create trade diversion.
Krishna (2005) provided a more complete narrative on RoO.  In line with Krueger
(1999), he mentioned that RoO are basically hidden protection; they create what look like
tariffs on imported intermediate inputs and they affect the price of domestically-made inputs
as well.  These RoO are negotiated industry-by-industry and there is enormous scope for
well-organized industries essentially to insulate themselves from any potential negative
effects by devising suitable RoO.  Thus, when RoO are agreed upon, they have some effect
on determining the extent of preferential treatment for fellow members.
Krishna, however, also showed that RoO had some beneficial characteristics.
Without RoO, a preferential trade agreement could be highly liberalizing, as the lowest tariff
would apply to each import category.  However, RoO are not entirely beneficial.  If
transportation costs are highly significant, trade deflection also has a real cost since it
wastes resources.  RoO thus might prevent or reduce such wastage.  For example, if
transshipping costs are slightly below the tariff differential, deflection occurs and welfare is
reduced while the consumer price is unchanged, resources are used in transshipment and
tariff revenue falls.  RoO help to prevent such a scenario.
RoO can also provide an incentive for regional producers to buy intermediate goods
from regional sources, even if their prices are higher than that for similar goods from outside
the region.  This is in order to make their product “originate” in a preferential trade
arrangement and thus qualify for preferential treatment eligibility.  However, in practice, this
protects suppliers, and therefore creates another form of trade protection.
With regard to methods, there are three approaches for determining origins:
(a) change in tariff heading/classification; (b) criteria for local value-added content; and
(c) specific manufacturing process requirement.  The change in tariff approach requires the
final product to have a different tariff heading than the input used, while the value-added
criteria approach requires a minimum value-added to be placed on the inputs, locally.  The
third approach requires that some specific production processes be undertaken in the local
economy.
In addition to the above three basic approaches, there are a few other rules that are
commonly included in the origin determination that are, or are related to:  (a) cumulation;
(b) the de minimis rule (or tolerance); and (c) duty drawback.
Cumulation regulates inputs from preferential trading partners that can be used in
the production of final goods without undermining the origin of the product.  There are three
types of cumulation regulation – bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation.  Diagonal
cumulation, which works on a regional basis, means that inputs from anywhere in the region
can be used without undermining the origin status.  Full cumulation, meanwhile, means that
any processing activities carried out in countries participated in an RTA are deemed to
satisfy the content requirements regardless of whether the activities are sufficient to confer
originating status on the input materials themselves.35
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Source: Reproduced from Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007.
Notes:
a Applicable for textiles, and wood-based products, iron and steel as an alternative rule, and
for wheat and flour as an exclusive rule.
b For yarns and fibres used for clothing and textile products, 8 per cent applies; the de
minimis rule does not apply to agricultural products or applies with restrictions.
c Strategic Economic Partnership (SEP); members: Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand
and Singapore.36
The de minimis rule, or tolerance, specifies a percentage of non-originating products
to be used in the production process without affecting the origin status of the final goods.
Duty drawback, meanwhile, waives applicable duties on the non-originating input
materials used in production.  It should be noted, however, that duty drawbacks are
commonly not allowed in many RTAs.
Another important aspect is the nature and characteristics of RoO from RTAs in East
Asia.  One characteristic is an increase in the variation of RoO provisions governed by RTAs
in the region (table 2.5).
11  In particular, RTAs in the region adopt a combination of the three
approaches as well as a varied cumulation and tolerance rule.  In short, East Asia’s multiple
RoO approach embedded in the overlapping RTAs, as noted in Kawai and Wignaraja
(2007), adds up to already complex RTAs in the region and creates the “noodle/spaghetti
bowl” effect.
Another characteristic is the movement towards substantially simpler RoO, despite
the noodle/spaghetti bowl argument.  Evidence of this is reflected in the evolution of RoO
provisions under AFTA and the more recent ASEAN FTA with China and the Republic of
Korea.  The simpler RoO provision under these RTAs allows producers to choose either the
change in tariff heading or the value-added content as the method for determining origin
status.  Given this already simpler provision, the ASEAN-Republic of Korea FTA moved
further to set even more liberalizing RoO provisions by substantially widening the coverage
of a number of products eligible for the adoption of the change of tariff classification method.
With regard to the simpler RoO, what initially was set by AFTA for the 40 per cent local
value-added content appears to have become a benchmark for the other RTAs.  The
ASEAN-China and ASEAN-Republic of Korea RTAs both apply the 40 per cent rule.
An important issue regarding RoO is related to their implementation.  There are
obviously some implementation issues, but one key issue appears to be the fact that there
is no guaranteeing RoO can always satisfy the idea of preferential trade in an RTA.  This
conclusion can be drawn from past experience of AFTA where there has been very low
utilization of preferential treatment from RoO provisions under AFTA (Kawai and Wignaraja,
2007; Baldwin, 2007; and Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007).  Given the absence of
information provided by the ASEAN Secretariat, some studies have estimated that the
extent of intra-ASEAN trade benefiting from AFTA preferences – translated into the AFTA’s
RoO provision – is very small, ranging from 3 per cent to 5 per cent of total intra-ASEAN
trade.
The question is, therefore, why have the preferences under AFTA not been optimally
used?  One reason could be because exporters are unable to satisfy the RoO requirement
for local value-added content, or at least have difficulties in doing so, due to the fact that
major manufacturing products traded within the ASEAN region have a high degree of the
product-fragmentation process.
11 See Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007, for a detailed summary of the nature and
characteristics of RoO provisions in East Asian RTAs.37
Another reason is the fact that the margin preference given by AFTA through its RoO
provisions is just too small to compensate for the costs of satisfying the origin requirements
– which means taking the preferential treatment offered by AFTA.  The complexity of
administering, and complying with, RoO burdens exporters with high compliance costs.  An
additional complexity arises from the difference in customs’ valuation across the ASEAN
countries (Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007).  This problem was earlier highlighted
during JETRO (2004) interviews with several Japanese firms operating in the ASEAN
region, when it was revealed that some exporters preferred to use the “red-lane” in customs
clearance procedures, instead of the “green-lane”, which offers traders in AFTA goods some
benefits in terms of lower costs for cargo handling and administration costs.
2.4.2.2. How do RTAs support IPNs?
How, then, can RTAs support IPN? There has not been much discussion of this
subject in the literature.
12  Having said this, however, a few studies have put forward ideas
on how RTAs could strengthen the formation and development of IPNs.
One idea suggested better designed and implemented RoO provisions were needed
in many RTAs.  Achieving this may require some refinement of the provisions – an example
would be the RoO provision improvement made by AFTA in the 1990s and early 2000s.
13
Based on the discussion above, refinement or improvement could be carried out in at least
two directions.  First, overlapping RoO across trade agreements should ideally be
harmonized.  As noted above, the overlapping RoO in East Asian RTAs gives rise to the
noodle bowl effect.  In fact, the 2006 JETRO survey of Japanese firms reported that more
than 60 per cent of the firms operating in the region thought that the RoO should be
harmonized; many of the firms preferred some form of common RoO approach (Japan
External Trade Organization, 2007).
Another idea suggested reducing the costs of the RoO.  This could be done by
introducing less restrictive cumulation rules, such as diagonal or full cumulation, allowing the
duty drawback provision, and setting a higher de minimis (tolerance) rule (Manchin and
Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007).  Full cumulation could facilitate increased product fragmentation
and, therefore, increased economic linkage and trade within a region.  Meanwhile, a higher
de minimis (tolerance rule) would reduce the too-stringent requirements imposed by local
value-added content or change of tariff classification, and therefore lower production
costs.  In addition, administration costs could be reduced in many ways that reflect the
“trade-friendly” approach.
The idea of reducing costs appears to be quite promising.  Estevadeordal and
Suominen (2005), for example, reported that where many of the above measures were
implemented they fostered trade creation compared to situations where RoO did not allow
duty drawback, higher tolerance and less restrictive cumulation rules.
12 In fact, this is what motivated the current study, with the aim of providing some insights into the
subject.
13 See Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007, for details of the improvement in AFTA’s RoO
provision.38
Taking the case of IPNs in East Asia, Kimura (2006) argued that RTAs could be
adopted as a vehicle to further activate IPNs.  This is based on two interconnected
presumptions that (a) RTAs are flexible policy tools, in terms of speed, scope, and
sequencing, and (b) many of needed policy initiatives for promoting IPNs are not covered by
WTO policy disciple.  Therefore, countries could make use of RTAs to design policy
initiatives that are needed to promote IPN activities in their countries.
Kimura (2006a) further asserted that although much had been done through
market-led liberalization, there was still much room for RTAs to promote IPNs, as
international transactions were far from friction-free and national border effects were still
high.  All these can be dealt with, in principle, by furthering the reduction in service link costs
– referring to the two-dimensional product fragmentation approach (Kimura and Ando,
2005a).  Based on this approach, policy initiatives under RTAs could be directed towards:
(a) Reducing the costs arising from geographical distance (e.g., removal of
explicit and implicit trade impediments, improving trade facilitation, developing
logistics services etc.);
(b) Promoting production cost savings in the fragmented production blocks (e.g.,
developing human capital, establishing a stable but flexible labour policy,
developing a strong but healthy financial sector etc.); and
(c) Promoting institutional building to reduce firms’ arm-length transactions (e.g.,
policies for reducing the informational cost of searching for business partners,
policies that secure intellectual property rights etc.).